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Introduction.
Quantum game theory models the behavior of strategic agents with access to quantum technology. For
example, agents might use observations of entangled particles to randomize their strategies as in [CHTW]
or [DL]; alternatively they might use quantum devices to communicate with each other or with the referee.
Among models of quantum communication, the most widely studied is the EWL model ([EW], [EWL]) of
Eisert, Wilkens and Lewenstein. Here we start with an ordinary game G, envision players who communicate
with a referee via a specific quantum protocol, and, motivated by this vision, construct a new game GQ with
greatly enlarged strategy spaces.
If G is a two-by-two game (that is: a game with two players, each of whom has a two point strategy
space), then the game GQ has strategy spaces that are naturally identified with the 3-sphere S3. A mixed
strategy in the game GQ is therefore an arbitrary probability distribution on S3.
Partly because the space of mixed strategies is so large, mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in the game
GQ can be difficult to find. The present paper ameliorates this difficulty by proving that up to a natural
notion of equivalence, all Nash equilbria have a particularly simple form. More specifically (and still up to
equivalence, as defined in Section 1):
1) Every mixed strategy that occurs in a Nash equilibrium is supported on at most four points of S3.
2) Those four points must lie in one of a small number of allowable geometric configurations.
I call a two-by-two game “generic” if, for each player, the four possible payoffs are all distinct and the
six pairwise sums of those payoffs are all distinct. In this paper, I will state and prove the main theorem for
generic games, referring the reader to my unpublished working paper [NE] for the (considerably uglier but
no more enlightening) generalization to the non-generic case.
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Section 1 lays out the motivation and the details of the EWL model. Section 2 presents the main
technical lemmas. Section 3 contains the main classification theorem (3.3). Section 4 addresses some natural
questions raised by the statement of the main theorem. Section 5 collects a few additional remarks and
applications; the most striking is that in any mixed strategy quantum equilibrium of any two-by-two zero
sum game, each player earns exactly the average of the four possible payoffs.
1. The Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein Model.
Let Gbe a two-player game with strategy sets S1, S2. The EWL construction is motivated by specifying
a purely classical communication protocol: A referee issues each player a penny in in one of two states H
(“heads up”) or T (“tails up”). A player indicates his choice of strategy by returning his penny either
flipped or unflipped. The referee observes the returned pennies and computes payoffs accordingly.
Now replace the pennies with subatomic particles whose state spaces are complex vector spaces with
basis {H,T}. A state is a line through the origin, which we will often denote by specifying some nonzero
point on that line. The state space for the pair of particles is the tensor product of the two individual state
spaces.
The referee prepares two pennies in the maximally entangled state H ⊗ H + T ⊗ T. Each player
returns the penny after acting on its state by the special unitary operator of his choice. The two classical
strategies (i.e. the strategies in the game G) are identified with the operators
C =
(
1 0
0 1
)
D =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
(1.0.1)
If Players One and Two select the unitary operators U and V, we denote the resulting state by
UV = (U ⊗ 1) (H⊗H+T⊗T) (1 ⊗V) (1.0.2)
The referee then performs an observation with the four possible outcomes CC, CD, DC and DD, and
makes payoffs accordingly; if we write
UV = α1CC+ α2DD+ α3CD+ α4DC (1.0.3)
(with complex scalar coefficients), then the probabilities of the four states are proportional to |α1|2, |α2|2, |α3|2, |α4|2.
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Now identify Player One’s strategy space with the unit quaternions by mapping the unitary matrix with
top row (A,B) to the quaternion A + Bj; identify Player Two’s strategy space with the unit quaternions
by mapping the unitary matrix with top row (P,Q) to the quaternion P − jQ. From (1.0.2) one readily
calculates the coefficients in (1.0.3) and discovers the following remarkably simple formula:
Proposition 1.1. Suppose Player One plays the quaternion p and Player Two plays the quaternion
q. Then for t = 1, . . . , 4, we have
|αt| = 2
∣∣∣pit(pq)∣∣∣
where the pit are the coordinate functions defined by
p = pi1(p) + pi2(p)i+ pi3(p)j + pi4(p)k
Motivated by Proposition 1.1 and the preceding discussion, we make the following definitions:
Definitions and Remarks 1.2. Let G be a two by two game with strategy spaces Si = {C,D} and
payoff functions Pi : S1×S2 → R. Then the associated quantum game GQ is the two-player game in which
each strategy space is the unit quaternions, and payoffs are calculated as
PQi (p,q) = pi1(pq)
2Pi(C,C) + pi2(pq)
2Pi(D,D) + pi3(pq)
2Pi(C,D) + pi4(pq)
2Pi(D,C)
Note that for any strategy p chosen by Player 1, and for any probability distribution whatsoever over the
four outcomes (C,C), etc., Player 2 can always adopt a strategy q that effects this probability distribution:
Let a2, b2, c2, d2 be the desired probabilities, let r = a+ bi + cj + dk and set q = p−1r. Therefore, in the
game GQ, there can never be an equilibrium in pure strategies unless one of the four strategy pairs leads to
an optimal outcome for both players. Thus in GQ, pure-strategy equilibria are both rare and uninteresting.
Next we consider mixed strategies. A mixed quantum strategy for G is a mixed strategy in the game
GQ, i.e. a probability distribution on the space of unit quaternions. If p is a unit quaternion, I will
sometimes identify p with the mixed strategy supported entirely on p. If ν and µ are mixed strategies, I
will write PQi (ν, µ) for the corresponding expected playoff to player i; that is:
PQi (ν, µ) =
∫
Pi(p,q)dν(p)dµ(q)
3
This gives rise to a new game GQ
mixed
, in which the strategy sets are the sets of mixed quantum
strategies in G. A mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in GQ is a Nash equilibirium in GQ
mixed
.
Our goal is to classify the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in GQ. The definitions that occupy the re-
mainder of this section kick off that process by partitioning the set of Nash equilibria into natural equivalence
classes.
Definition 1.3. Two mixed strategies µ and µ′ are equivalent if
∫
pit(pq)dµ(q) =
∫
pit(pq)dµ
′(q)
for all unit quaternions p and all t = 1, 2, 3, 4.
In other words, µ and µ′ are equivalent if in every quantum game and for every quantum strategy p,
we have P1(p, µ) = P1(p, µ
′) and P2(p, µ) = P2(p, µ
′).
Example 1.4. The strategy supported on the singleton {p} is equivalent to the strategy supported
on the singleton {−p} and to no other singleton.
Definition 1.5. Let ν be a mixed strategy and u a unit quaternion. The right translate of ν
by u is the measure νu definied by (νu)(A) = ν(Au) where A is any subset of the unit quaternions and
Au = {xu|x ∈ A}. Similarly, the left translate of ν by u is defined by (uν)(A) = ν(uA). The following
proposition is immediate:
Proposition 1.6. Let (ν, µ) be a pair of mixed strategies and u a unit quaternion. Then in any game
GQ, (ν, µ) is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if (νu,u−1µ) is.
Definition 1.7. Two pairs of mixed strategies (ν, µ) and (ν′, µ′) are equivalent if there exists a unit
quaternion u such that ν′ is equivalent to νu and µ′ is equivalent to u−1µ. Note that this definition is
independent of any particular game.
Proposition 1.8. In a given game, a pair of mixed strategies is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
every equivalent pair of mixed strategies is also a Nash equilibrium.
2. Preliminary Results.
Theorems 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 are the main results which will be used in Section 3 to classify Nash equilibria.
Theorem 2.1. Every mixed strategy is equivalent to a mixed strategy supported on (at most) four
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points. Those four points can be taken to form an orthonormal basis for R4.
Proof. First, choose any orthonormal basis {q1,q2,q3,q4} for R4. For any quaternion p, write
(uniquely)
p =
4∑
α=1
Aα(p)qα
where the Aα(p) are real numbers.
Define a probability measure ν supported on the four points qα by
ν(qα) =
∫
S3
Aα(q)
2dµ(q)
For any two quaternions p and q, define
X(p,q) =
4∑
α=1
piα(p)piα(q)Xi (2.1.1)
Then for any p we have
P (p, µ) =
∫
S3
P (pq)dµ(q)
=
∫
S3
P
(
4∑
α=1
Aα(q)pqα
)
dµ(q)
=
4∑
α=1
P (pqα)
∫
S3
Aα(q)
2dµ(q) + 2
∑
α6=β
X(pqα,pqβ)
∫
S3
Aα(q)Aβ(q)dµ(q)
= P (p, ν) + 2
∑
α6=β
X(pqα,pqβ)
∫
S3
Aα(q)Aβ(q)dµ(q)
To conclude that µ is equivalent to ν it is sufficient (and necessary) to choose the qα so that for each
α 6= β we have ∫
S3
Aα(q)Aβ(q)dµ(q) = 0
For this, consider the function B : R4 ×R4 → R defined by
B(a,b) =
∫
S3
pi1(aq)pi1(bq)dµ(q)
B is a bilinear symmetric form and so can be diagonalized; take the qα to be an orthonormal basis with
respect to which B is diagonal. Then we have (for α 6= β)∫
S3
Aα(q)Aβ(q)dµ(q) =
∫
S3
pi1(qαq)pi1(qβq)dµ(q)
= B(qα,qβ) = 0
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Theorem 2.2. Taking Player 2’s (mixed) strategy µ as given, Player 1’s optimal response set is equal
to the intersection of S3 with a linear subspace of R4.
(Recall that we identify the unit quaternions with the three-sphere S3.)
Proof. Player One’s problem is to choose p ∈ S3 to maximize
P1(p, µ) =
∫
P1(pq)dµ(q) (2.2.1)
Expression (2.2.1) is a (real) quadratic form in the coefficients pii(p) and hence is maximized (over S
3)
on the intersection of S3 with the real linear subspace of R4 corresponding to the maximum eigenvalue of
that form.
Definition 2.3. We define the function K : S3 → R by K(A + Bi + Cj + Dk) = ABCD. Thus
in particular K(p) = 0 if and only if p is a linear combination of at most three of the fundamental units
{1, i, j, k}.
Theorem 2.4. Let µ be a mixed strategy supported on four orthogonal points q1,q2,q3,q4 played
with probabilities α, β, γ, δ. Suppose p is an optimal response to µ in some game where it is not the case
that X1 = X2 = X3 = X4. Then p must satisfy:
(α− β)(α − γ)(α− δ)K(pq1) + (β − α)(β − δ)(β − γ)K(pq2)
+(γ − α)(γ − β)(γ − δ)K(pq3) + (δ − α)(δ − β)(δ − γ)K(pq4) = 0
(2.4.1)
Proof. Set pn = pin(p) and consider the function
P : S3 ×R4 → R
(p,x) 7→
∑4
n=1 p
2
nxndµ(q)
In particular, if we let X = (X1, X2, X3, X4) then P(p, X) = P1(p, µ).
The function P is quadratic in p and linear in x; explicitly we can write
P(p,x) =
∑
i,j,k
tijkpipjxk
for some real numbers tijk.
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Set
Mij(x) =
4∑
k=1
tijkxk
Nij(p) =
4∑
k=1
tikjpj
so that
M(x) ·


p1
p2
p3
p4

 = N(p) ·


x1
x2
x3
x4

 (2.4.2)
If p is an optimal response to the strategy µ, then (p1,p2,p3,p4)
T must be an eigenvector of M(X),
say with associated eigenvalue λ. From this and (2.4.2) we conclude that
N(p) ·


X1
X2
X3
X4

 = λ ·


p1
p2
p3
p4

 = N(p) ·


λ
λ
λ
λ


where the second equality holds by an easy calculation.
Thus N(p) must be singular. But it follows from a somewhat less easy calculation that the determinant
of N(p)/2 is given by the left side of (2.4.1).
3. Classification.
Definition 3.1. Let G be a two-by-two game with payoff pairs (X1, Y1), . . . , (X4, Y4) (listed in
arbitrary order). G is a generic game if the Xi are all distinct, the Yi are all distinct, the twofold sums
Xi +Xj are all distinct and the twofold sums Yi + Yj are all distinct.
Theorem 3.3 will classify Nash Equilibria in GQ where G is any generic two-by-two game. Subtler
versions of the same arguments work for non-generic games (yielding somewhat messier results); see [NE].
To state Theorem 3.3 we need a definition:
Definition 3.2. Let p,q, r, s be quaternions; write p = p1+p2i+p3j+p4k, etc. Then the quadruple
(p,q, r, s) is intertwined if there is a nonzero constant α such that
α(Xp+ Y q) = Xr+ Y s
identically in the polynomial variables X and Y .
Thus if the components of p,q, r, s are all nonzero, then (p,q, r, s) is intertwined if and only if the four
quotients p1
q1
, p2
q2
, p3
q3
, p4
q4
are equal (in some order) to the four quotients r1
s1
, r2
s2
, r3
s3
, r4
s4
.
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The intertwined quadruple (p,q, r, s) is fully intertwined if (p, r,q, s) is also intertwined.
We can now state the main theorem:
Theorem 3.3. Let G be a generic game. Then up to equivalence, every equilibrium in GQ is of one
of the following types:
a) Each player plays each of four orthogonal quaternions with probability 1/4.
b) Each player’s strategy is supported on three of the four quaternions 1, i, j, k.
c) µ is supported on two orthogonal points 1,v; ν is supported on two orthogonal points p,pu, and
the quadruple (p,pv,pu,pvu) is fully intertwined.
d) Each of µ and ν is supported on two orthogonal points, each played with probability 1/2. Moreover,
the supports of µ and ν lie in parallel planes.
e) Each player plays a pure strategy from the four point set {1, i, j, k}.
Proof. Let (ν, µ) be an equilibrium. By (2.1) we can assume that each of ν and µ is supported on a
set of at most four orthogonal points. Applying a translation as in (1.7) we can assume that the support
of µ contains the quaternion 1. Then from standard facts about orthogonality in the space of quaternions,
the support of µ is contained in a set of the form {1,u,v,uv} where u2 = v2 = −1 and uv+vu = 0, played
with probabilities of α, β, γ, δ ≥ 0. We will maintain these assumptions and this notation while proving
Theorems 3.4, 3.5, 3.9, and 3.10, which together imply Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 3.4. ν is a pure strategy if and only if µ is a pure strategy.
Proof. If ν is a pure strategy, Player Two can guarantee any desired probability distribution over four
outcomes; by genericity his optimal probability distribution is unique.
Theorem 3.5. If the support of ν contains four points then µ assigns probability 1/4 to each of four
strategies.
Proof. Explicitly write u = Ai+Bj + Ck,v = Di+ Ej + Fk,uv = Gi+Hj + Ik. Write
M =

AB DE GHAD DF GI
BC EF HI


By (2.2) the quadratic form
p 7→ P1(p, µ) (3.5.1)
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is constant on the unit sphere S3. Therefore its non-diagonal coefficients are all zero. Computing these
coefficients explicitly and dividing by (non-zero) expressions of the form (xi − xj), we get
M · (β, γ, δ)T = (0, 0, 0)T (3.5.2)
But M also kills the column vector (1, 1, 1)T . Thus we have two cases:
Case I. β = γ = δ. Then the four diagonal terms of (3.5.1) (which must all be equal) are given
by (X1 + X2 + X3 + X4)β + Xi(α − β), with i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Since the Xi are not all equal, it follows
α = β = γ = δ = 1/4, proving the theorem.
Case II. M has rank at most one. From this and the orthogonality of u,v,uv, we have {u,v,uv} ∩
{i, j, k} 6= ∅. Assume u = i (the other cases are similar). Then A = 1, B = C = D = G = 0, H = −F and
I = E. The four diagonal entries of (3.3.1) are now equal; call their common value λ so that we have


α β E2γ + F 2δ E2δ + F 2γ
β α E2δ + F 2γ E2γ + F 2δ
E2γ + F 2δ E2δ + F 2γ α β
E2δ + F 2γ E2γ + F 2δ β α

 ·


X1
X2
X3
X4

 =


λ
λ
λ
λ

 (3.5.3)
Combining (3.5.2), (3.5.3), the conditions α + β + γ + δ = E2 + F 2 = 1 and the genericity conditions, we
get α = β = γ = δ as required.
Corollary 3.5A. If either player’s strategy has a four-point support, then each player plays each of
four orthogonal quaternions with probability 1/4.
Proof. Apply Theorem 3.5 twice, one as stated and once with the players reversed.
Theorem 3.9, dealing with the case where ν is supported on exactly three points, requires some prelim-
inary lemmas:
Lemma 3.6. It is not the case that Player Two plays 1,u,v each with probability 1/3.
Proof. If 1,u,v are played with probability 1/3 then one computes that the eigenvalues of the form
(2.2.1) are X1 +X2 +X3, X1 +X2 +X4, X1 +X3 +X4, X2 +X3 +X4, which are all distinct by genericity.
Thus Player One responds with a pure strategy, and Theorem 3.4 provides a contradiction.
Lemma 3.7. Suppose the support of ν is contained in the linear span of 1, i, j. and suppose that 1
and i are both optimal responses for Player Two. Then one of the following is true:
a) The support of ν is contained in the three point set {1, i, j}
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b) The support of ν is contained in a set of the form {1, Ei+Fj,−Fi+Ej} with Ei+Fj and −Fi+Ej
played equiprobably.
Moreover, if b) holds and either j or k is also an optimal response for Player Two, then 1 is played with
probability zero.
Proof. Suppose ν is supported on three orthogonal quaternions q1 = A+Bi+Cj, q2 = D+Ei+Fj,
q3 = G+Hi+Ij, played with probabilities φ, ψ, ξ. The first order conditions for Player Two’s maximization
problem must be satisfied at both 1 and i; this (together with genericity for the game G) gives
(
AC DF GI
BC EF HI
) φψ
ξ

 =

 00
0

 = (AC DF GI
BC EF HI
) 11
1

 (3.7.1)
so that by (3.6) with the players reversed, the matrix on the left has rank at most one. This (together with
the orthogonality of q1,q2,q3) gives {q1,q2,q3} ∩ {1, i, j} 6= ∅. We can assume q1 = 1 (all other cases
are similar); thus A = 1, B = C = D = G = 0, H = −F , I = E. Now (3.7.1) says EF (ψ − ξ) = 0. If
EF = 0, then a) holds and if ψ − ξ = 0 then b) holds.
Now suppose j is also an optimal response for Player Two. Then 0 = P2(ν, i)− P2(ν, j) = φ(Y2 − Y3),
so that by genericity φ = 0. A similar argument works if k is optimal.
Lemma 3.8. Suppose ν is supported on exactly three points and continue to assume that µ is supported
on a subset of {1,u,vuv}. Then at least two of the four quaternions 1,u,v,uv are optimal responses for
Player One.
Proof. By (3.5), µ is supported on at most three points; we can rename so those points are 1,u,v.
These are played with probabilities α, β, γ and we can rename again so that α lies (perhaps not strictly)
between β and γ.
If p is any optimal response by Player One, apply (2.4) with δ = 0 (and possibly γ = 0) to get
σ1K(p) + σ2K(pu) + σ3K(pv) + σ4K(puv) = 0 (3.8.1)
where σ1 = (α − β)(α− γ)α, etc., so that
σ1, σ4 ≤ 0 and σ2, σ3 ≥ 0 (3.8.2)
Case I: Suppose none of the σi is equal to zero. Then γ 6= 0 so a) holds.
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By (2.2), the support of ν spans a three-dimensional hyperplane in R4 and thus must include some
quaternion of the form A+Bu (A,B ∈ R). Inserting p = A+Bu into (3.8.1) gives
AB(σ1B
2 − σ2A
2)K(1 + u) = 0 (3.8.3)
Thus either AB = 0 (in which case either p = 1 or p = u) or K(1 + u) = 0. This and similar arguments
establish the following:
If 1 and u are both suboptimal responses, then K(1 + u) = 0. (3.8.3a)
If 1 and v are both suboptimal responses, then K(1 + v) = 0. (3.8.3b)
If u and uv are both suboptimal responses, then K(1 + v) = 0. (3.8.3c)
If v and uv are both suboptimal responses, then K(1 + u) = 0. (3.8.3d)
Taken together, these imply that if the lemma fails, then K(1 + u) = K(1 + v) = 0. From this it
follows that {u,v,uv} ∩ {±i,±j,±k} 6= ∅; assume without loss of generality that u = i and therefore v is
in the linear span of {j, k}. (Generality is not lost because the argument to follow works just as well, with
obvious modifications, in all the remaining cases.)
Now we have
P1(A+Bv, µ) = αP1(A+Bv) + βP1(Ai +Bvi) + γP1(Av −B)
= A2
(
αP1(1) + βP1(i) + γP1(v)
)
+B2
(
αP1(v) + βP1(vi) + γP1(1)
)
which is maximized at an endpoint, so either 1 or v is an optimal response for Player One. Similarly, at
least one from each pair {1,uv}, {u,v}, and {u,uv} is an optimal response, from which b) (and therefore
the lemma) follows.
Case II: Suppose at least one of the σi is equal to zero. Up to renaming u and v, there are three ways
this can happen:
Subcase IIA: α = β, γ = 0. As above, Player One’s optimal response set contains a quaternion of the
form (A + Bu). But P1(A + Bu, µ) is independent of A and B, so both 1 and u are optimal, proving the
theorem. (Note that v and uv are also both optimal, so that in fact by (3.5A) this case never occurs.)
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Subcase IIB: α = β, γ 6= 0. By Lemma (3.6), γ 6= α, β. Thus σ3 and σ4 are nonzero, so (3.8.3b),
(3.8.3c) and (3.8.3d) (but not (3.8.3a)) still hold. But σ1 = σ2 = 0 so the same techniques now yield
If 1 and u are both suboptimal responses, then K(1 + u) = 0. (3.8.3e)
If 1 and v are both suboptimal responses, then K(1 + v) = 0. (3.8.3f)
We can now repeat the argument from Case I.
Subcase IIC: α 6= β, γ = 0. Now we have σ1, σ2 6= 0, σ3 = σ4 = 0, so that (3.8.3a) through (3.8.3c)
still hold, along with (3.8.3e) and (3.8.3f). We can now repeat the argument from Case I.
Theorem 3.9. If ν is supported on exactly three points, then up to equivalence, both µ and ν are
supported on three-point subsets of {1, i, j, k}.
Proof. By (3.5) we can assume that µ is supported on {1,u,v}. By (3.8) we can assume without
much loss of generality that 1 and u are optimal responses for Player One. (The argument below works
equally well, with obvious modifications, for other pairs.) Let w be a quaternion orthogonal to 1 and u
such that the support of ν is contained in the linear span of 1,u and w.
By (2.2), any quaternion of the form X + Y u+ Zw is an optimal response for Player One, so by (2.4)
we have
σ1K(X + Y u+ Zw) + σ2K(Xu− Y + Zwu) + σ3K(Xv+ Y uv + Zwv) + σ4K(Xuv− Y v + Zwuv) = 0
identically in X,Y, Z. Writing out the left side as a polynomial in these three variables, the coefficients,
all of which must vanish, can be expressed in terms of the components of u,v,w. Setting all these
expressions equal to zero and solving, we find that {u,v,w} ∈ {±i,±j,±k}. (The details of this tedious
but straightforward calculation can be found on pages 32-33 of [NE].) We assume u = i, w = j.
Claim: Player Two’s strategy is not supported just on 1 and i. Proof: If so, the fact that
P1(1, µ) = P1(i, µ) implies that µ assigns equal weights to 1 and i, which implies P1(j, µ) = P1(k, µ),
contradicting the fact that j but not k is optimal for Player One.
Thus the support of µ is a three-point subset of {1, i, j, k}. It now follows from Lemma (3.8) (together
with the assumption that the support of ν contains three points) that the support of ν is {1, i, j}, completing
the proof.
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Theorem 3.10. Suppose ν is supported on two points. Then µ is supported on 1,u and ν is supported
on two quaternions p,pv where either
a) The quadruple (p,pu,pv,pvu) is fully intertwined or
b) u = v and each player plays each strategy with probability 1/2.
Proof. Suppose 1 and u are played with probabilities α and β.
Any unit quaternion of the form Xp + Y pv is an optimal response for Player One; thus (2.4) with
q1 = 1,q2 = u, γ = δ = 0 gives
(α− β)
(
α2K(Xp+ Y pv)− β2K(Xpv + Y pvu)
)
= 0
. This, plus the identical observation with the players reversed, estabilishes full intertwining except when
α = β = 1/2. In that case, P1(p, µ) = P1(pu, µ) so pu must be optimal; i.e. we can take v = u.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.3.
Remark. The statement of Theorem 3.3 makes it natural to ask for a classification of fully intertwined
quadruples of the form (p,pv,pu,pvu) with u, v square roots of −1. That classification is provided in [I].
The thrust of the result is this: All such quadruples fall into one of approximately 15 families. Each of
these families is at most four-dimensional (inside the twelve-dimensional manifold of all four-tuples). For all
but one of the families, it is easy to tell by inspection whether a given quadruple satisifies the membership
condition. The exceptional family is one-dimensional.
In short: Condition b) of Theorem 3.3 allows only four dimensions worth of possible equilibria, all of
which are easily identifiable except for a one-dimensional subset.
4. Minimal Payoffs and Opting Out
Theorem 3.3. classifies all mixed strategy Nash equilibria in generic games. Here we briefly address
the issue of whether these equilibria survive in a larger game where the players can opt out of the assigned
communication protocol.
A key tool is the very simple Theorem 4.1; this and its corollary 4.1A apply to all two by two games
(whether generic or not) and are of independent interest:
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Theorem 4.1. Let G be a game with payoff pairs (X1, Y1), . . . (X4, Y4). Then in any mixed strategy
quantum equilibirum, Player One earns at least (X1 +X2 +X3 +X4)/4.
Proof. Player One maximizes the quadratic form (2.2.1) over the sphere S3. The trace of this form
is X1 +X2 +X3 +X4, so the maximium eigenvalue must be at least (X1 +X2 +X3 +X4)/4.
Corollary 4.1A. If, in Theorem 4.1, the game G is zero-sum, then in any mixed strategy quantum
equilibrium, Player One earns exactly (X1 +X2 +X3 +X4)/4.
Proof. Apply (4.1) to both players.
4.2. Remarks on Opting Out. A player can throw away his entangled penny and substitute an
unentangled penny (or for that matter a purely classical penny, but this offers no additional advantage,
because the unentangled quantum penny can always be returned in one of the two classical states H or
T). However, a simple quantum mechanical calculation shows that if Player One unilaterally substitutes
an unentangled penny, then no matter what strategies the players follow from there, the result is a uniform
distribution over the four possible outcomes. By Theorem 4.1, Player One considers this weakly inferior to
anyGQ equilibrium. Thus, even if we allow players to choose their pennies, all of the GQ equilibria survive.
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